Christian philosophers often overlook the crucial importance of a nondiscursive manifestational witness to God’s powerful redemptive work, as they overemphasize the role of discursive, intellectual reasons. This deficiency may be the residue of a dubious kind of epistemic coherentism that lacks the needed resources of a modest experiential foundationalism. Alternatively, it may stem from a debilitating confusion of the conditions for one’s either having or manifesting evidence and the conditions for one’s giving an argument. We do well, however, not to confuse evidence and an argument. If all evidence is an argument, we face a devastating epistemic regress problem.
One’s foundational reasons or evidence need not be discursive or assertive, but can be nonpropositional character traits supplied by God’s Spirit: love, joy, peace, patience, gentleness, and so on (see Gal. 5:22–23). Accordingly, John’s Gospel portrays Jesus as announcing that his disciples will be known by their agapē for others (Jn. 13:35). Jesus did not mention, allude to, or use any philosophical arguments in this connection, or in any other connection, for that matter. The same is true of his followers who are represented in the New Testament, although some of them were perfectly capable intellectually of wielding philosophical arguments. This noteworthy fact, moreover, does not qualify as a deficiency in their actual reasons, evidence, or mode of engagement.Talk is cheap, especially regarding God, and therefore many inquirers will wonder whether a confession has support from a corresponding nondiscursive witness, which can have power and cogency irreducible to statements and arguments.
Paul K. Moser, Gethsemane Epistemology, Philosophia Christi, Vol. 14, No. 2, Page 267.
Moser’s brilliant paper makes a convincing case that calls for evidence of God can never be divorced from the particular context of the individual demanding the evidence. We experience the power of God on his terms and then become personified evidence for him.